For those interested :-)

These essays were answered by Andrew for a friend of ours, Bethany, who is using his answers to help with a class she's teaching. The essays are long and you are, by no means, required as a friend of ours and reader of our blog, to read these. He asked me to post them in the event that anyone else was interested. So, without further ado, the essays:

Essay #1: Describe the Iraqi culture you've encountered. Be sure to compare the lifestyle you see to both your own American lifestyle and to what you were told to expect before coming. What key differences are there? What similarities? Identify in particular anything that has surprized you and discuss its impact on your stay there.

Iraqi culture. First you have to understand that the question is based on the, what I shall refer to as the "Outsider Hypocritical Bias". What I mean by this is as such. If you were an outsider from country X and spent 7 months, 12 months, or even 15 months in New York, your view of American culture would be vastly different that if you spent the same amount of time in San Francisco, and even more so if you spent it in Chapel Hill. So as you can see we as Americans, as I'm sure all citizens of any country, tend to group an entire foreign country into one stereotype. Even worse, we tend to look at one event, one city, or one region, and assume that whatever we see there is true for the entire region. It is most likely human nature, however if you really want to understand Iraq, you must have this bias in mind.

I have at this point spent 3 months in Rawah, which is located in Western Al Anbar Province. Even by Iraqi standards, it is a "hick backwater" city. To our west, you will find towns like Samsiyah, Hassa, Al Qaim, and then the Syrian border, and to our east, more familiar names like Ramadi, Falluja, and even further east Baghdad. I have visited some other towns around this area, but for the most part all of my experience is here, so please understand that I cannot be seen as an expert on Iraqi culture any more than a visitor to Chapel Hill is an expert on American culture. I have conducted 50 or more key leader engagements, 30 patrols both dismounted and mounted, of which 12 can be considered straight combat patrols. I live within the city and work every day with the Iraqi police, Iraqi Army, and to a limited degree, the city officials. I have been on census patrols through the streets, speaking to locals about a variety of subjects, and I have been out in the hinter lands a few times looking for weapons caches and IEDs. I have dealt with over a hundred former detainees who have been released on a weekly basis. This in not an attempt to give you my resume but instead is simply a context in which to take the rest of my viewpoints.

The people in this town are unlike those you would find in the aforementioned towns, much like the people in one city in America are unlike those you would find in a neighboring city. So I guess that would be my first cultural inconsistency that we were never briefed on, though I should have expected it since I have visited other countries before. There is a limited, but still present diversity in Iraq. It isn't ethnic, or not always religious through certain regions, but instead the same sort of diversity that all people of all nations exhibit.

Now more toward what I think your question is really about. What do I see in the Iraqis I work with and interact with? Iraqis have a different value system, based on much different circumstances, than anything we have ever seen in the US. It is evident in everything they say and do that these people have lived with violence, limited rights, and under different forms of tyranny (first from Saddam, then from the insurgents) for most of their lives. This translates into a much more subdued and cautious view of their future. In America, we see our lives from an early age as full of limitless possibilities (at least in the ideal). In Iraq, future is an uncertain thing, scary, and filled with doubt.

As I mentioned earlier, Iraqis have a different value system than we do. Honor, family, and survival are the focal point of most of their decision making. You will note that such ideals such as honesty, charity, education, and hard work are missing. This is not to say that all Iraqis lie, but they do not put the same stock in telling the truth that we do. Most Iraqis would not blink at telling you a lie, not always with the intent deceive you, but sometimes because they think that by distorting the facts, they are telling you what you want to hear, and thus making avoiding confrontation. Not all Iraqis lack the will to give freely in time and money to worthy causes, but it isn't as intrinsic as it is in America, where self sacrifice is part of our norm. Iraqis don't deny the importance of education, but it isn't a priority like in America, since education does not always lead to success or even advancement. Not all Iraqis are lazy, in fact some of them do a great deal of work. But I don't see the same sort of pride you see in many Americans for hard work. I guess the bottom line is that Iraqis are survivalist and self serving. This is not a judgment on my part, but simply a statement. I do not think ill of them for being this way, because it is what has allowed them to survive 4 recent wars, and the insurgency. To act in any other fashion would not be rational, and not how we would react give the same circumstances.

Now for the biggest cultural mistake that most people make about Iraq. It isn't a Sunni thing, or a Shia thing. In fact it's an Al Rawii, or Swaheri, or Begali thing. To quote a member of the former Clinton team, "it's the tribes stupid!" Tribal relations matter infinitely more than the religious card in the day to day lives of Iraqis. There are tribes that have both Sunni and Shia, and there are Sunni tribes that hate each other more than they hate Shia. Iraqis were Arab long before they were Muslim, so that history in many ways have effected the every day Iraqi more here than what their religious affiliation is. The entire Al Anbar awakening can be attributed to Sheiks, not Imams (tribal leaders, not religious leaders). While Iraqis will flock to the Mosque at ungodly hours to pray, in the end, whatever their Sheik says has more impact, and they are usually the real power brokers.

Ok a few other points. We were told over and over again about certain quirks of Iraqis that we would have to be very culturally sensitive. First, don't eat with your left hand, don't try to get right down to business right away, they don't respect things like being on time, are all wrong. These are stereotypes placed by people who are overly culturally sensitive and aren't aware of basic human nature.

Eating and waving with your left hand, it isn't a cultural thing in as much as a hygiene thing. Normally the left hand is associated with wiping of ones ass, therefore is associated with being dirty. Obviously it isn't as much offensive as it is just gross. But that doesn't really apply to all Iraqis. Those that have indoor plumbing and running water wash their hands, and left handed Iraqis are damned, they simply eat with their left hands and don't think anything of it.

My first key leader engagements and meetings took my by surprise. I was expecting the first 30 minutes to be small talk and pleasantries. Instead, I walked into the room, and nearly had my ear talked off by the business they wished to discuss. Again it's human nature. If they have gone out of their way to come see you, or have set up a meeting for a specific purpose, then that means they want to get down to the meat and potatoes right away. If the meeting is last minute and unexpected, then they may spend the first few minutes trying to feel you out and figure out what is on your mind before allowing the discussion to progress. Also if you are dealing with someone for the first time, it is natural to try to build up a repertoire before you start asking the hard questions. This is no different than in the US. Also you have to remember that expressing how you really feel was frowned upon in the old regime, so it isn't an automatic response to first encounters all the time.

The being on time thing still baffles me. We were told that Iraqis are flexible with timelines and always expect them to be late. This is more a circumstance of personality than culture, like it is in the US. Some will show up late all the time, while others have actually have lectured my boss on being 15 minutes tardy.

So I guess the basic principle in Iraq is that every Iraqi is above all else an individual, with some similarities and values, but you must approach each one with a very open mind to new experiences and not be a slave to what may have happened in the past.

Ok so this one may not have been a true essay answer to the question, but really I could write for hours on all the things I have seen and experienced here, and they would both be true, and yet incredibly biased since my slice of the pie is only a small part. You can't really experience Iraqi culture and expect to understand it with any certainty in the short time we've been here, and by we I mean America. We've been allies with Britain for decades, and unless you've studied AND lived there, you can only hope to catch a glimpse. Instead what I hope this part will do is show you that Iraqis are much like the rest of the world, in that they are individuals, driven to decisions by personally and society ideals, and that you can't judge an entire culture by one encounter, one news broadcast, or even by one war. Also it is absolutely necessary that when we as coalition forces work with Iraqis, we understand that our ideals and their ideals do not match. Overall I would say that we do a good job of this, making sure we agree on standards and goals together and don't try to interpret their actions through our way of thinking.

Essay #2: "Media bias" and "media misrepresentation" are big buzz words nowadays. Drawing on your experience in Iraq, explain how or what you believe the media is misrepresenting -- and, if applicable, what they've got right. You should discuss not only the media's perception of the military's role and progress in Iraq, but, if possible, the presentation of Iraqi response.

I will take a more academic approach to this answer. I have four points on this question. First, "Media bias" is a universal truth, and not more applicable to Iraq any more so than any other reporting. Secondly, the "media misrepresentation" is an unfortunate truth for those of us on the ground here. Thirdly is that the media has not gotten much right, nor have they gotten much wrong. Lastly, the media's impact on the single Marine on the ground is almost equal to the doings of our adversaries here.

For my first point, we must realize that all mediums are biased if they are of a non-fictional variety. Every report in the news from Iraq is given at least a 30 second to minute blurb, and perhaps 100 words of text, and at most 100 times that in most cases. However, in order for you to understand an event in its entirety, even something as common place as an IED attack on coalition forces, you would need at least 2-3 hours of context, facts about the event, and possible ramifications based on analysis from individuals as close to the event as possible. There is no way that the media would be able to pay that much attention to every single event and still be able to provide other news. Instead they must pick and choose what context they will provide if any, which facts are most important to bring to light, and what THEY believe are the consequences. This is true with reports of murder in the US, oil spills in far off oceans, or natural disasters in previously ignored countries. So by definition, the media will not be able to provide the real story, but only their representation of what is occurring.

When an IED goes off, there are hundreds of individuals here that examine everything having to do with the blast. At best, the people back home will know who was injured and where it happened. And everyday, an IED goes off somewhere in Iraq (albeit much less frequently than a year ago). Not every one is reported by the news. An example again would be the recent suicide attack on sheiks and coalition forces in Al Anbar a few weeks back. What we saw and what the American people saw are two entirely different things. Was it media bias? Absolutely, but that is because there is no way they could have given all the facts surrounding the incident even if they were allowed to simply because there was too much information for a single news story. So media bias does not effect us any more than any other place in the world. Every story will be biased because it will never include all of the facts and will be based on what the reporter and the news service feels is important. It is all a representation of the event, not a real description of all facts.

That being understood brings me to my second point. Since all media is biased, it is, in my mind, the responsibility of reporters and news agencies to report an event in its own light, and as much as possible without the influence of other events. Also, news agencies must report a variety of events, allowing for an overall picture of what is going on. This may not make sense at first, but understand that the media tends to steamroll on a given topic. For instance, four years ago, there was a child abduction that took place that got a lot of media attention. Because of this, other child abductions were given more air time than usual, and soon the media had convinced the American public that there was an epidemic of abductions sweeping the nation. In reality there were no more abductions that year than the year previous or the year before that. But as the media began to get a "theme" to their reporting, they started to bias their reports to conform to their theme. Facts were given that made each case a close fit to the string of abductions that they claimed were occurring. If they had taken each event in its own light, and reported based simply on that event, they would have been able to avoid causing a national panic that was unnecessary. They might claim that it led to action, but instead the only real result was that after the first case, all others simply became part of the "theme" and not a report in its own right. Much like I discussed taking Iraqis on a case by case basis, you must do the same with every event otherwise you will be a victim of your own assumptions and unable to grasp the situation at hand.

Especially during a time of war, the media must be wary that they are unable to dispense all the facts, and should tailor their reporting to include as many different aspects as possible without diagnosing their own "theme" to the situation. They can't possibly show you everything that is going on, so therefore you can take any string of events and morph them to support whatever thesis you wish to prove.

During the initial invasion, the media was behind the war, as was the majority of the American public. There was a string of nation pride in the fact that we were taking down a dictator. So the media, acting on this particular bias, and sensing that news stories about US successes would be far more appealing than anything else, represented the invasion for the most part in a positive light. The theme was victory. This was a mistake. By providing an over abundance of positive attention, the media not only did not represent a cross-section of all the events on the ground, but also desensitized the American public to positive reporting about Iraq. Like a football team that is undefeated early in the season, fans that never had any feelings one way or another suddenly are thirsting for reports of weakness and failure. So by not giving any real airtime to the trials and tribulations of the campaign, and only over representing all of the successes, the media thus created the backlash that followed and that we have slowly moved out of since then.

Ok, that was a lot of talk about previous actions that have not occurred during my current tenure here. Why go to all of that trouble without discussing my own experiences? Well like I stated earlier, you need the context before you can begin to understand the event. So here I am in Iraq, and how is the media misrepresenting me. First off, and this has been a complaint from many of my compatriots who have returned here for a second, third, or forth tour, since the backlash from the media following the invasion, news simply doesn't exist substantially for the positive events in Iraq. Since I've been here, there has been a school opened, a court house rebuilt, over a thousand detainees released and repatriated to fairly significant success, and numerous acts of heroism on the part of the Iraqi Police's, Iraqi Army's, and regular citizens. These are in no way the total list of events, but instead merely a representation. And in no way have these only been confined to the last 3 months or the last 3 years. I have it on good faith from guys that have been here before that this isn't new, good things like this happen all the time in Iraq. The number of good things haven't increased, the number of bad things have just decreased. But because the media after the invasion had the theme of American set backs, then the theme of American struggle, then America on the brink of failure we never heard about these good things with any frequency. And not just reports of good things, but also reports of none negative things. Obviously, if an IED goes off and no one is hurt it really isn't news worthy, but how about some statistics. There have been a dozen or so IED attacks around my area, but we have found more IED's than have gone off. Not only that, but of the attacks, there have been no casualties. Instead of reporting this, there is no news from Iraq until the next suicide bomber blows up a market place.

Also, what about some news about how Iraqis have changed since the Anbar Awakening. In my town, there are numerous houses being built. Note I say built and not rebuilt. It is only one example of how the Iraqis are beginning to see a future and hope for how their lives might fair. I've been very observant of the news coming out of our area since our arrival, and I can tell you this fact, as well as any other example of progress, is simply not being reported.

So the media is bias, but they are always biased. Where they fail to represent the war is by not doing a variety of stories on successes and failures. On positive and negative events, in order to give an overarching view of how things really are on the ground. By doing so, they have portrayed a war different than the one we are fighting.

My third point leans toward an understanding of the media's misrepresentation, though not a complete forgiveness of their response. Any facts, cold and hard, given during any news report are true, especially if reported by the military, in as much as facts can be given the chaotic nature of violence and warfare. By law, we are not allowed to give any information that is untrue, or intended to deceive the American public. We are not required to give all information, especially that which can endanger American lives, however if coalition forces report an IED went off and x number of people were killed, it is, as far as the military leadership knows at the time, truth. So the media has on numerous occasions been right when they report on events in terms of the facts. However, the media is also wrong. Rarely when later reporting shows that earlier reporting was in error, they do not make the corrections necessary to continue to report the fact. Let's take for instance the battle in Falluja. Earlier in the fight there was reporting that there were hundreds, and then thousands of civilian casualties. This report didn't come from US sources, but instead from Iraqi and Al-Jazeera based since the military was not yet in a position to ascertain the collateral damage. As the battle progressed, it became apparent that the number of civilians injured and killed was much lower than originally thought, however in the media this was never corrected. Therefore, even civilian leadership made decisions based on what the media continued to report.

Ok, again how does this translate to me, in the here an now? Since the first reports seem to be the only one that matters, it means that the military is much more cautious with giving numbers and figures for any event, because we want to make sure we have it right. This gives the enemy an advantage, since they are in no way bound by the same rules and regulations we are. So many times, they will inflate casualty figures, or skew other facts, and we are frustrated here because even when we do push the actual facts out, it is usually too late. If the phrase "who ever spins first spins best" is true in the political realm, it is even more true and more dangerous in the realm of war. It also means that the individual Marine on the deck has little to no hope of America at large truly knowing what happens to him, and this frustration is repeated by numerous of my subordinates and peers.

My last point is something I hope your students take to heart. This war is a media war, more so than any other war because news is so easily available back in the states on so many different levels. We in Iraq see with our own eyes the progress in terms of the security situation, the way the Iraqis interact with us, and the increased prosperity throughout our AO as the Iraqis pick themselves up. Yet we know that all it takes is one news story that is out of context, or one news story that blows a situation out of proportion to bring the cards all tumbling down. Where as in the past, a Marine was faced with protecting himself, protecting his buddies, and accomplishing the mission, today he must also realize that even if he does the right thing at the right time, if the media portrays the event in the wrong light, we will be seen as villains and his and his peers hard work will be for not. The American public may say they love their soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines, but they still do not always trust that they are doing the right thing (a residual effect from Vietnam I think) so in many cases they will assume the worst if they don't know all the facts. And the media does not help the situation. The Marines are investigated more here than they ever were in previous wars for making life and death decisions. This isn't because the command doesn't trust them, but because the media has forced them to investigate everything that transpires to ensure that if false accusations are made by the enemy, they can be refuted. The enemy knows this is a public relations war, and because the media does not discern between the different sources and will publish whatever information they receive, it forces us to find out all the facts about every event in almost real time. While this may make sense to me and the higher ups, it puts an incredible strain on the young Marines who have to make that choice between pulling the trigger and not pulling the trigger. Not only must he decide in the span of a heart beat whether it is the right choice, he has the added pressure of scrutiny by his command and the media for the event afterwards. Also it means that if you have 100 Marines or even a thousand Marines doing the right thing and winning the war the right way, it only takes one doing the wrong thing to void our actions, because the news will always report the exception, and not make it clear that it is not the rule.

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Essay #3: It's difficult for the average American at home to understand the daily living with violence in Iraq. Again drawing on your own experience, describe the violence in the area you're in. Explain the primary risks as best you can without compromising any security. Discuss if you can the way Iraqis seem to have adapted to their situation. Explain the risks to you and your unit and the way they're handled (again, without compromising security) and, if possible, compare your experience to that of other Marines stationed in more/less volatile areas of the country.

Violence in Al Anbar province has changed a lot in the last year. Acts of violence have decreased, and it is more of a possibility now than a general rule, though they still occur. Even so, every Marine is aware that there are still people out there who wish to do us harm in one way or another, so it is imperative that we are ever vigilant. This is some ways this is infinitely worse than living with it day to day. The strain on leadership is incredible, because without the daily attacks and violence, it can be difficult to keep the Marines focused. Where as a year ago you never had to worry about ensuring your Marines had all their protective gear on because they had seen first hand the result of such negligence, now you have to be ever aware of when Marines start taking short cuts. As we say around here, complacency kills. All it takes is one Marine not paying attention to the road in front of him and missing the IED, or a Marine on post falling asleep because he has stood it a hundred times without anything of interest happening and not seeing the sniper, or a Marine not cleaning his weapon because he only shoots it when he does his marksmanship training so it misfires when he finally does take contact. While it isn't something we wish for, a casualty in combat is sometime inevitable, yet a casualty that could have been avoided is even worse. All of our Marines are aware of the danger, but ensuring that they do all they can to avoid that danger is a constant battle.

This is no different than in any other conflict throughout history. Civilians may see the strange rules and regulations that we are placed under back in the states and wonder why we are forced to be so disciplined. The bottom line is that war is long periods of inactivity interrupted by a flurry of disorder and chaos. You don't know when it is going to come, and do not always have time to prepare for it. This being said, a Marine's discipline is what gets him through all situations. A Marine does the right thing when it matters because he has done the right thing a thousand times when it didn't seem to matter. It is this discipline, as it exists and is enforced, that allows leaders to ensure that even if they aren't present for every event, they can feel confident that their Marines will perform well.

The risks here are the same as they were a year ago. IED's on the road, in cars, or as suicide vests, snipers and ambushes, and mortar attacks are the primary dangers. Though they are not as commonplace, they still exist, and each of those events has happened somewhere in Iraq since we've been here. So how do the Marines deal with it? It's strange to say, but every Marine, especially in the infantry accepts that they will be put in personal danger at some point in their tenure. It's part of our job and in many cases why we joined up. Obviously we don't seek to have harm done to us or our comrades, but each of us yearns (either secretly or openly) for the chance to be tested by fire and found not wanting; to prove that we are equal to the Marines who have come before us and capable of meeting the challenge of combat. As for the stress of possibly being killed or injured, it isn't something you think about. You do everything in your power to ensure it doesn't happen to your or those in your charge, but beyond that don't dwell on it. The unit before us only took one combat related casualty while they were here, and we have been even more fortunate than that, yet as I stated earlier the possibility of it still exists and we guard ourselves for what we see as an eventuality.

So how does this compare to a year ago or even in present day in other parts of the country? As veterans have stated, there is little difference in how the Marines deal with the violence. Even if we haven't had it done to us, everyone has seen its effects in some way since we've been here. Individuals take stock of what is at stake, and leaders continue to be protective. I walk with Marines outside the wire, and I can see that they still look for the possibility of violence. Some do it out of the memory of what they experienced a year or two years ago. Other do it because they don't want to let their buddies down by failing at their job. This isn't any different than any other Marine stationed anywhere else in the country. Individual circumstance may differ from place to place, but a combat patrol is a combat patrol.

As for the Iraqis, they have been living with violence for most of their lives, either during their numerous wars that have occurred or during the insurgency. They deal with this through a lot of the survivalist tendencies I discussed earlier, and being extremely wary of possible dangers to themselves and their families. Because of this history, many seem to have less stock placed in human life because they have seen so much death in their time. This is to not to say they do not care, but instead that they very accepting of death and the possibility of it. Many go about their lives normally, and operate as we would in the states. But when violence does visit them and their community, I have every confidence they will do everything they can to avoid it and push on after it.

It has secondary effects as well. Something as simple as ensuring you pick up all your trash is not common place here, because why worry about such small issues when you may not live long enough to see any reward from it. It is most likely the root of what we perceive as laziness or corruption. Iraqis, as I have seen, will go to great lengths for personal gain, and will cut corners we would not see in the US. This is not because they are inherently immoral, but because human nature is to do what you can to survive, and when survival is not a guarantee, you will make survival a priority before anything else.

The last thing I want to say on this topic is that the respect I have for the Iraqi Security Forces is much greater than it was before I came. They have the hardest job in all of Iraq. I do not wish to comment on their proficiency or dedication, because you have some good, some bad, and some corrupt, but I will say that they are as much (if not more so) the target of insurgent attacks as anyone else. While we serve for 7 - 15 months, with our families safely tucked away back in the states, they will live and work here for the rest of their lives. They are subject to all the same dangers we are as well as their families and they still do it for little pay and few benefits. Say what you want about them, I will forever be in awe of those who put on their uniform day after day and continue to do their jobs even with all that is at stake for them.

Essay #4: The war in Iraq is a new war in many ways. Drawing on your knowledge of history (which we know is extensive), compare the current war to previous soldiers' outing in the following areas:

-the nature of the enemy and the war not being with clear fronts

-the nature of soldiers' lives, with the technology connections to

home and somewhat modernization of the bases (I say

somewhat, because while you've got satellite TV, you've

still got those bags. And ew.)

How do you think these changes have affected soldiers' experience of the war?

The idea that Iraq is a new war is in many ways inaccurate, and is not only an injustice to the Marines who have fought in the past, but also is impairment to understanding our current situation. What I will do for this answer is discuss how this war is different, but also discuss how the war is not redefining how we understand conflict. I will then discuss how both the changes and similarities effect Marines experiences.

First I will discuss how this war is not different from previous wars. It will be based on how I have experience it, since there are many more scholarly and intelligent men and women who have discussed this topic at length. I will begin by talking about the enemy, then will discuss the Marines lives here.

The media likes to talk about the lack of defined fronts as being the big difference between this war and previous wars. I would say that this is stated by those who are not familiar with more than tertiary knowledge of past conflicts. Vietnam, Somalia, the Balkans, are all example of wars that have seen conflict on non-linear scales. In fact, Iraq is a classic example of a counter insurgency fight which is by and far the more common form of warfare than the conflicts between the world powers. Especially in the present day, low intensity conflicts take place all over the world, and are almost mirror images of what is going on in Iraq. The Marine Corps history actually has us fighting more of these wars in places like Nicaragua, Cuba, Haiti, and all over the world than the front-laden conflicts like World War II. All you would need to do is reference publications written as long ago as 1954, or even perhaps Sun Tzu to a lesser degree, to find information on these types of wars. I would say that there is very little about this conflict that I did not expect. If this was a mold breaking fight, then essentially we would be forced invent techniques for overcoming our adversaries. Instead we are using the same methods to find snipers, IED's (or as they were called in Vietnam, booby traps), and to defeat the enemy that Marines have been using since our inception. We are not treading a new path, but instead walking in the footsteps of our ancestors

The enemy himself has a plethora of history as well to reference in how he fights. I could get into a long discussion about the differences between insurgents, and guerillas, and freedom fighters, however that will not do much for our current topic. Instead I will talk about how he is similar to combatants from the past. Any time an adversary has a disadvantage in war, he will seek to avoid whatever gives his opponent the upper hand, and will seek the perceived weakness that he can exploit. Ho Chi Mihn did it in his wars with the French, Moa Tse Dong did it during his people's rebellion, and we did it during the revolutionary war to some extent. This is not to say any of these conflicts saw the exact same ideals, tactics, and events, but does show how when confronted with superior numbers, technology, or proficiency, a combatant will most likely attempt to change the rules and venue by which they will engage their opponent.

Also this is not the first time Marines have faced an enemy with a different morale standards. The enemy will do unto us the same atrocities that Marines witnessed in Vietnam. Nor is it the first time that the enemy has hid among the population and in no way held to the rules of the Geneva Convention. The bodies of the contractors that were displayed in Falluja bring back memories of the bodies of American soldiers displayed after Mogadishu. Our enemy is brutal, and is a thinking enemy, as have all of our enemies in the past. We strive to understand him and outsmart him, and in the end deny him his goals.

As for the Marines lives, there is a difference between how we live now, and the way Marines lived in previous wars. However, the difference is only in actual creature comforts. Relative to the way Americans live back home, it is not any different than wars of the past. We have by and large moved into a defensive phase of this war. As with any defense, the longer you are in there, the more time you spend on force protection and habitability. What starts as fighting holes, become bunkers, then wooden posts, followed by concrete structures. At first you eat chow you've packed with you, then hot food begins to move out to your position, and eventually you have a no kidding chow hall built that you will be able to go to three times a day. Your defenses start with sandbags, then get replaced by barbed wire, and eventually are replaced with concrete barriers. This is not a new phenomenon in Iraq, but instead a principle of war seen as far back as war itself. The bases we have here, and positions we inhabit, have been improved over the course of months and years. They are not terribly different from the same positions Marines improved during the Korean Conflict along the Pusan Perimeter.

So I've talked about how our war is not a new war, and how we have not found ourselves in a conflict previously unseen. Now I will relate some of the things that are different. First, we'll discuss the nature of the enemy. The brutality that we see in the insurgents, and the lengths that they will go to achieve their goals is not new. But what is new is their resources and ability to adapt. I won't go into detail, but we know that overall, Al Queda is the first world wide terrorist organization to fight on a global scale. That being said, jumps in telecommunications technology bring with it new capabilities. Also our enemy has new and innovative uses for technology that we have to be constantly prepared to deal with. Lastly, the enemy is able to use the global audience in ways that were not possible before. I've already discussed this to some degree earlier, and won't expand on it further. Suffice to say that he is aware that all the world is watching, and he is constantly thinking of ways to exploit that.

While our lives here in Iraq are not different from previous wars relative to how different average American lives are different back home, it cannot be ignored that there is still a difference. I would venture to say that the biggest difference is our ability to have constant and direct connection to the world outside of Iraq. We are able to talk to loved ones as often as possible, we can read and watch news from anywhere in the world, and many events (like the Super Bowl) are not completely lost to the majority of the service members. This has both positive and negative repercussions. On the plus side, it takes much of the stress of isolation out of the equation. While we still are separated from our loved ones, we are not deprived communication with them and can up to date on events back home. Also it keeps the Marines in touch with the civilized world and allows them to keep that aspect their lives, even if it is limited. This can do a lot for not having them completely transformed by their experiences here into something unrecognizable when they return home, and helps keep them in touch with their own rational and civilized selves.

On the negative side however, it can lead to complications in both personal and unit actions. Obviously operational security is put at risk by the ability for a Marine to send repeated messages back home that cannot be monitored with the same vigilance as simple letters. Also, problems back home have an even larger impact here than in the past. Where as a spouse or child having trouble might be mentioned in a blurb in a letter before, now the Marine may get play by play accounts in almost real time, which can distract Marines from their mission here. Not only that but it means that loved ones back home and the world as a whole may feel that they have a more thorough understanding of what life is really like in Iraq. The truth is that even this long paper cannot fully describe to you all the events, both for lack of time and inability to share all details.

Other differences are here, but do not greatly impact the lives of the Marines. A Marine may have the ability to play X-Box, but it is merely a way to pass the time in between missions much like playing cards and reading books. We may have more gear, but the Marines are accountable for it and maintain it the same as they have in the past. They may be able to watch movies on their personal laptops, but you would find the Marines of World War II flocking to whatever tent was showing the new John Wayne film. We definitely have more creature comforts, like air conditioning, bottled water, and I-Pods, but all it has done is kept pace with the same creature comforts we are used to back home.

So how does all this affect our experience in Iraq? I would venture to say while some of the details may change, and the who and where are different, we fight this war in much the same way our predecessors did. Each individual Marine will be able to talk to veterans of past conflicts and share the same sorts of stories. We have a mission, and we strive to accomplish our mission with as few casualties, and as quickly as possible. The enemy still wishes to do us harm and he is adaptive and ever changing. We make mistakes, learn, and press on. We take time to communicate home, rest and relax, and improve the situation in which we are placed. Our lives here have changed only as much as our lives have changed when we are back home, and I would argue that the gap between home and here is actually greater than in the past because we still undergo much of the stress and struggle of combat without any difference.

Essay #5: What, to you, entails a victory in this war?

This question must be prefaced with this caveat. In no way do my viewpoints or opinions represent that of the greater Marine Corps. But here is how I see it. All politics aside, because I don't feel qualified to really speak on that subject, a military victory here will encompass two things. First, Iraq must be stable and able to stand on their own with little support from us in day to day security and operations, and that we have a continued presence and alliance with Iraq for decades to come. That is victory to me because of two things. First, anything but a stable Iraq will mean disaster for our global image, and also for the region's stability as a whole, and lastly in morale in America and the military. Secondly, one of the reason's radicalism and terrorism has flourished in the region is because we have not had a large and continued presence outside of areas like Saudi Arabia and some of the more financially elite countries. As for democracy planting here, I don't know that I can say one way or another, but I will tell you that I do see freedom and individual rights progressing, and hopefully will eventually bring these people prosperity.

That to me describes victory on a grand scale. As for our little piece of the pie, I simply want to leave Rawah better than when we got here so that the unit that follows us will be able to continue to build on our successes and learn from our mistakes. It may not be in leaps and bounds, but small steps here will push us in the direction of the victory I spoke of above. Finally I want to leave Iraq having taken no more human life than is necessary to accomplish our mission.

Epilogue:

I am a Company Executive Officer. I have operated in a small chunk of Iraq, and at this point only a few months out of a protracted war. I don't pretend to be an expert on any of the matters discussed above, nor do I know of anyone who would consider themselves experts. I simply have the experiences of myself and those around me to draw on, so I hope that some of this insight is helpful in sparking further discussion for you and your class on the subjects.